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For millennia, the notion of “wisdom” has been thepurview of philosophers or religious scholars. Philoso-phers literally loved and sought wisdom; biblical scholars
lionized King Solomon, wisest man of all.1 More recently, how-
ever, psychologists have begun to investigate the concept of
wisdom empirically. Beginning in the mid-1970s and proceed-
ing apace,2 social scientists have studied wisdom from a vari-
ety of perspectives, falling under two headings of implicit and
explicit theories.3
IMPLICIT THEORIES OF WISDOM
At least three different approaches have been taken to the
development of implicit theories of wisdom. One thread of
research, probably the most common, uses a three-step factor-
analysis approach: one sample of participants is asked to gen-
erate a list of traits or characteristics of wisdom generally or of
a wise person. Another sample rates that list of traits on, for
example, how typical each is of wisdom or of a wise person,
and the resulting ratings are then factor analyzed to identify
and articulate the underlying dimensions.4
Such studies generally converge on a small set of qualities,
dimensions, or clusters that are seen to represent aspects of wis-
dom or the wise person.5 Almost all identify a strong cognitive
component to wisdom—intelligence, reasoning ability, knowl-
edge, experience, or problem solving. Over and above this intel-
ligence, however, participants typically identify some sort of
exceptional insight as a hallmark of wisdom. Most also identify
a reflective component—introspection, intuition, ability to
learn from mistakes, even temperament (with some of these
qualities overlapping with the “exceptional insight” element). A
fourth trait, which all these studies identify, is affective, dealing
with interpersonal relations and a concern for others. Finally, at
least two studies identify some real-world problem-solving abil-
ity—having good judgment, being able to apply it in real life,
giving good advice.6 This last is closely connected to Aristotle’s
concept of phronesis, discussed briefly below.
A second implicit-theory approach asks participants to nom-
inate wise people, typically but not necessarily those known to
the participant, and then studies traits of the nominee or asks
the nominee to engage in some sort of wisdom-related activity
so that wise features can be identified.7 A third, less common,
approach experimentally manipulates aspects of wisdom or of
wise people to tap participants’ intuitions. For instance, Francis
Hira and Patricia Faulkender showed subjects videotapes of
individuals speaking about wisdom-related life problems, vary-
ing the age and gender of the speaker but not the content of the
presentation.8 Participants in that study rated older men and
younger women as more wise, implicating, perhaps, cultural
stereotypes about the wise person rather than a particular idea
of wisdom itself (although the authors attributed their findings
in part to nonverbal cues enacted by the speakers).
EXPLICIT THEORIES OF WISDOM
Two of the more prominent explicit psychological theories
are the Berlin Wisdom Paradigm (BWP) and Sternberg’s Bal-
ance Theory.9 Both emphasize elements of historical discus-
sions of wisdom, and both emphasize a conception of wisdom
as roughly analogous to expert functioning in a domain. 
The former, growing out of a life-span-development
approach that emphasizes successful aging, defines wisdom as
“expert knowledge in the fundamental pragmatics of life that
permits exceptional insight, judgment, and advice about com-
plex and uncertain matters” and as “expertise in the conduct
and meaning of life.”10 The BWP defines wisdom in terms of a
broader construct rather than a personality characteristic.11
Wise individuals approximate the ideal of wisdom and serve as
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guideposts, and the role of psychological theory is to study
how people can be described as wise.12 The BWP designers are
more interested in the big-picture concept of wisdom as a “col-
lectively anchored product”;13 others seem more interested in
identifying, among other things, the individual differences
associated with wisdom, wise people, wise decision processes,
and wise outcomes.14 Of course, there seems no a priori reason
not to study both.15
The second prominent explicit theory of wisdom is Stern-
berg’s Balance Theory, which involves a foundation of general
knowledge or academic intelligence, on which is rested tacit
knowledge or practical intelligence.16 First, wisdom inheres in
the interaction between a person and his situation. Sternberg’s
take on whether individuals can be wise is not clear from this
point; on the one hand, he seems to focus on wisdom as
process-focused. On the other hand, he often does refer to “wise
people,” “people who acquire wisdom,” and individual differ-
ences in both variables predicting wisdom and affecting the bal-
ancing process.17 Second, an individual’s decision making is not
wise or unwise (foolish) per se; rather, its “wisdom depends on
the fit of a wise solution to its context.” Third, as a result, the
same sort of balancing of decision-making processes may yield
a wise solution in one context but not another. Accordingly,
wisdom for Sternberg seems to inhere primarily in a decision’s
fit to the situation, rather than in an individual as a personal
characteristic (though this is not certain), in a decision-making
process, or in an outcome per se. As noted below, this question
of where to locate wisdom—as a trait, in a process, or in an out-
come—is an important definitional issue but also an important
one for developing further research.18
PRACTICAL WISDOM (PHRONESIS)
In the discussion of judicial wisdom, phronesis or practical
wisdom is important to note; three aspects are particularly rel-
evant here. First, Aristotle saw phronesis as an executive deci-
sion maker, a “master virtue” that tied together and managed
the others. But it is also more; it involves the skill to perceive
a situation the right way in the first place, recognizing the
need for action, and the skill to identify what features of a sit-
uation are most relevant and most deserving of further delib-
eration.19 Perhaps most important, though, Aristotle saw the
deliberation process, as does Sternberg, as having the “good”
as the ultimate objective; that is,
phronesis involves deliberation
or reflection about valuable
goals.20
Second, Anthony Kronman
built on Aristotle’s notion of
practical wisdom in his efforts to
recapture what he saw as the lost
ideal of a lawyer-statesman.21
Kronman saw practical judg-
ment/practical wisdom/phrone-
sis at the heart of this ideal;
political and judicial skill
depends on excellence in this
character trait. He too empha-
sized balance and the impor-
tance of combining internal decision-making skills—reflective
and perceptual elements. That is, practical wisdom was a skill
or “capacity” for joining those elements together in the appro-
priate way.22 The wisdom of a decision cannot be measured
solely by its final result but only—as with Sternberg—by
whether there is balance between the circumstances of the case
and the reasoning about those circumstances.23 A wise judge
need not have particular personal qualities that lead him or her
to be a wise judge; rather, he or she has certain dispositions
that interact appropriately with the situation at hand and allow
the judge to reason his or her way to the best outcome.24
Kronman makes two final points about practical judgment.
He states that people’s practical-judgment skill can be devel-
oped and believes that an ideal setting for developing the
means necessary for developing the skill is law school. The
critical thinking, understanding of particulars, sympathy,
imagination, and detachment necessary for thoroughly devel-
oping phronesis rest comfortably on the Socratic Method so
typical of legal education. Kronman, then, sets out two criteria
by which the wisdom of outcomes or decisions can be mea-
sured. The first is the degree of suitability or fit.25 The second
is the degree to which it “promote[s] political fraternity” by
accommodating differing viewpoints and maintaining the
coherence of a community with those different views.26
Perhaps the most direct application of phronesis to the judi-
cial context is recent neo-Aristotelian work by Lawrence
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Solum. Quite simply, judicial wis-
dom is phronesis; it is practical
wisdom, as applied to the deci-
sions a judge makes.27 The virtu-
ous judge possesses multiple
judicial virtues—courage, impar-
tiality, incorruptibility, intelli-
gence, and others—but also pos-
sesses the ability to manage
them.28 The wise judge knows
what goals to pursue and how to
arrive at those goals.29 According
to Solum, phronesis is “the ability
to respond appropriately to the
particular situation,” to identify
what is morally relevant about a
particular situation, and to craft a just resolution. Indeed, for
Solum, this synthesis or balancing becomes an exercise of Aris-
totelian equity: the “tailoring of the law to the demands of the
particular situation.”30
The review here details the philosophical and legal writing
on practical wisdom, potentially or actually applied to the
judicial context. However, very little work has been con-
ducted to translate those theories into empirical testing. One
of our goals here is to connect this line of legal and philo-
sophical thinking to empirical work in psychology and lay the
groundwork for a fuller program of research synthesizing it
all. Thus, we turn briefly now to some of the existing empiri-
cal work on wisdom, recognizing a lack of empirical work on
judicial wisdom.
PRIOR PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH
First, as mentioned, researchers have studied laypeople’s
implicit theories of wisdom.31 These studies have elicited
broad consensus as to the various components of wisdom—the
five elements identified above—and consensus that wisdom
involves some sort of integration, synthesis, or balance of those
capacities.32 There also seems to be broad agreement in
implicit conceptions of wisdom that wise people are usually
old,33 but there is less agreement, perhaps surprisingly, that
men are more typically wise than are women.34
Second, more “top-down” work has focused on explicit the-
ories, on conceptualizing and measuring the wisdom construct.
One approach has focused on “general wisdom,” with the par-
adigmatic examples being the Berlin approach and Sternberg’s
model. Another approach has focused more on “personal wis-
dom,” viewing it as a construct that reflects personal growth,
life experience, dealing with life challenges, or ego and identity
development.35 Researchers taking the latter approach have
sought to develop and validate self-report scales to measure
their notion of the wisdom construct. On the one hand, there is
often overlap in their theoretical constructs; on the other hand,
to the extent personal wisdom involves a substantial amount of
self-reflection, self-report may not be the best evaluative mea-
sure. Instead, promising efforts have been made to look at “per-
formance-based” measures.36 For judicial-wisdom purposes,
general wisdom constructs seem more appropriate to pursue.
Third, researchers have studied the development of wisdom
and wisdom-related knowledge over the life span, again distin-
guishing between general and personal wisdom. Much of this
literature has looked to determining whether one type of wis-
dom might precede the other (apparently not; the development
of personal and general wisdom seems to be a dynamic process
where either can “take the lead”). Other literature has sug-
gested a model that synthesizes personality correlates of both
types of wisdom (creativity, fluid and crystallized intelligence,
openness to experience, and others), experiential factors, and
sociocultural factors, all of which combine to facilitate the
development of wisdom.37
Perhaps surprisingly, neither type of wisdom is directly cor-
related with age; simply growing older is not sufficient to grow
wiser.38 Older individuals produce higher wisdom-related per-
formance in response to dilemmas typical of older age;
younger individuals score higher on young-adult-type dilem-
mas.39 Nor is general wisdom-related performance correlated
with well-being,40 but negative life events might conduce to
increases in personal wisdom.41
Fourth, of importance for judicial-wisdom issues,
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researchers have examined the “plasticity” of wisdom, i.e., how
and whether it might be facilitated or taught. One useful
means of facilitating wisdom-related performance as measured
in the Berlin paradigm was to discuss the problem at hand with
a confidant; this was effective even when that confidant was
imagined.42 There is an interesting but underexplored connec-
tion here with Kronman’s suggestion that the Socratic Method
is useful for developing phronesis; perhaps even the imagined
Socratic dialogue can help individuals exhibit increased wis-
dom. More direct means, such as instructions to “try to give a
wise response,” have generally been found to be ineffective,43
perhaps suggesting some difficulty in introspecting about and
tapping into one’s own wisdom-related capabilities. Sternberg
is more adamant that wisdom, or at least wisdom skills, can be
taught: first, study classic works of literature and philosophy;
second, encourage dialogical thinking (perceiving ideas from
multiple points of view) and dialectical thinking (recognizing
that ideas evolve over time); third, encourage students to self-
reflect and develop their own values; fourth, develop all these
modes of thinking with an eye to the common good; fifth
(again connected with earlier points), encourage a Socratic
teaching style; and sixth, have teachers act as role models for
wisdom. Sternberg and colleagues developed a curriculum for
teaching wisdom in middle schools, laying out an approach
and a series of evaluative measures; however, we have not seen
published follow-up to these efforts.44
Finally, this last point about the educability of wisdom has
been extended in applied fields, with researchers exploring the
relevance of these explicit theories of wisdom in education and
in leadership contexts—management, business, etc. Indeed,
Sternberg has developed a model of leadership that synthesizes
creativity, intelligence, and his Balance Theory of wisdom.45 An
appropriate balance will help leaders build on certain strengths
and balance the leader’s own capabilities as well as the capa-
bilities of those being led, all to achieve a common good in the
relevant field. Other applications to leadership have empha-
sized situational factors, asking what situations conduce to
wise leadership.46 Still others emphasize that a wise leader will
know what situations call for what leadership style and act
appropriately.47 More specifically, wise decision making has
been studied in the contexts of medicine, nursing,48 business,49
clinical psychology,50 and politics,51 sometimes drawing
explicitly on the models sketched above.
Strangely, perhaps, despite
application in these settings,
there is no published empiri-
cal work examining wisdom
in the applied setting of judg-
ing—of judicial wisdom—
despite the traditional image
of the judge as an archetype
of wisdom. The only empiri-
cal work we have found
directly implicating judicial
wisdom was an unpublished
doctoral dissertation, in
which the author administered an existing wisdom scale
(Ardelt’s [2003] 3D-WS) to Missouri judges.52 She also noted
potential implications for using this or other wisdom scales as
a tool in (s)electing judges. The studies presented here aim to
empirically establish scales of judicial wisdom drawing on the
work done by previous philosophers and psychology
researchers alike. 
STUDY 1
Methods
The first study was done in two parts, following the most
common approach in wisdom research. In the first part, judges
were asked to generate characteristics of wise judges. Then,
law students rated these characteristics on whether they accu-
rately reflected judicial wisdom. 
STUDY 1A
Participants
Forty federal magistrate judges (27 men and 13 women)
completed questionnaires during a voluntary session at two
judicial-education conferences in 2009. Twenty-three judges
participated in Session 1 (first conference) and seventeen in
Session 2 (second conference). Judges signed up for a session
on “Judicial Decision-Making,” during which they completed
a questionnaire and were debriefed. They then heard a general
presentation regarding theoretical and empirical research into
judicial decision making and engaged in discussion and a
question-and-answer session with the presenters. Thirty-four
participants self-identified as white, four self-identified as
black, and two did not provide an ethnic identification.
42. Ursula M. Staudinger & Paul B. Baltes, Interactive Minds: A Facil-
itative Setting for Wisdom-Related Performance?, 71 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 746, 755-56 (1996).
43. Judith Glück & Paul B. Baltes, Using the Concept of Wisdom to
Enhance the Expression of Wisdom Knowledge: Not the Philosopher’s
Dream but Differential Effects of Developmental Preparedness, 21
PSYCHOL. & AGING 679, 685 (2006).
44. See Robert J. Sternberg, Why Schools Should Teach for Wisdom: The
Balance Theory of Wisdom in Educational Settings, 36 EDUC. PSY-
CHOLOGIST 227 (2001).
45. Robert J. Sternberg, A Systems Model of Leadership: WICS, 62 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 34, 39 (2007).
46. Michael J. Limas & Robert O. Hansson, Organizational Wisdom,
59 INT’L J. AGING & HUM. DEV. 85 (2004).
47. Leon C. Malan & Mark P. Kriger, Making Sense of Managerial Wis-
dom, 7 J. MGMT. INQUIRY 242 (1998).
48. Andrew McKie et al., Exploring Clinical Wisdom in Nursing Educa-
tion, 19 NURSING ETHICS 252 (2012).
49. Limas & Hansson, supra note 46.
50. BLAINE J. FOWERS, VIRTUE AND PSYCHOLOGY: PURSUING EXCELLENCE
IN ORDINARY PRACTICES (2005).
51. PETER J. STEINBERGER, THE CONCEPT OF POLITICAL JUDGMENT
(1993).
52. Kathleen A. Mehl Chadwick, A Study of the Measurement of Wis-
dom in the Missouri State Judiciary (July 2007) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Capella University). The author also stated
that she had found no studies examining the wisdom of legal pro-
fessionals.  
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Procedure
Half of the participants were
asked to list (among other things)
“characteristics of a wise judge.” To
assess whether their perceptions
involved not wisdom per se but
rather competence or skill, the
other half were asked to list “characteristics of an excellent
judge.” Participants were asked to provide a variety of demo-
graphic and professional information, including age, gender,
education, ethnicity, religious affiliation, political-party affilia-
tion, political orientation, number of years in service as a judge,
and the federal circuit within which they sat. Judges identified
130 discrete features of a “wise judge” and 142 of an “excellent”
judge.
STUDY 1B 
Participants
Participants were 286 incoming first-year law students. 
Procedure
Participants were given packets of surveys including the
130 discrete features of a wise judge identified by the judges in
Study 1A. Participants were asked to rate each one of the char-
acteristics on a Likert scale (1, not at all, to 7, very), as to how
accurately the feature captures judicial wisdom. 
Results
The first goal was to establish a reliable scale of characteris-
tics of a wise judge. To do this, independent raters grouped the
130 features judges listed in Study 1A by dividing them into 32
categories, with all raters coming to an agreement. The data-
analytic strategy used in these analyses includes exploratory
and confirmatory factor analyses. Briefly, both types of analy-
ses test the similarity between groups of items.53
Confirmatory factor analysis was then used to derive the
most representative feature for each of the 32 categories. Using
a confirmatory factor analysis tests whether the items in the
group are related based on a predetermined factor structure. In
the next set of analyses, we use the 32 representative charac-
teristics to further classify the characteristics (32) into broader
themes of judicial wisdom. 
After conducting an exploratory factor analysis, 19 of the
original 32 characteristics loaded onto four factors. This pro-
cedure reduces the 32 characteristics into categories of similar
themes. During this procedure, only items that are highly
related are retained (.4 factor loading).54 The exploratory fac-
tor analysis resulted in 19 characteristics of judicial wisdom
having a loading of .4 or greater. The remaining items did not
reach this threshold. Five of the items that could have been
confusing to participants were dropped from analyses. With
one such feature, for instance (“willingness to learn, to chal-
lenge and be challenged”), participants could have agreed with
the former part of the statement but not with the latter. Two
items were dropped due to cross loading55 among two or more
factors (e.g., “knowledge of the law”), and six items were
dropped due to poor loading (e.g., “balances interests of all
parties, including judge’s own interests”). These items may
have been too broad to be applied to the specific content of
what makes a wise judge.
The analysis yielded four categories of judicial wisdom. We
interpret the factors broadly as consistent with previous find-
ings described in the implicit-theories literature. Factor 4
reflects the cognitive, decision-making skill typically identified.
Factor 3 is consistent with the reflective characteristic, and Fac-
tor 2 with the interpersonal or affective characteristic. We also
identified Factor 1, a quality reflecting wisdom-related skills
particular, if not unique, to judges. This may reflect the real-
world problem-solving ability that some researchers have
found,56 or, more interestingly, something over and above con-
ventional perspectives of wisdom that reflects judicial wisdom
specifically.57
STUDY 2
Method
The goal of the second study was to confirm the structure
76 Court Review - Volume 52 
53. A factor analysis is a statistical strategy that finds relationships
between observed variables. In this case, the observed variables
are the characteristics of wise judges. Through correlations
among the observed variables, the factor analysis determines
commonalities among the items; those assessing the same con-
struct will be grouped together. The formation of this group is
called a factor or unobserved variable. In this paper, we discuss
two kinds of factor analysis—exploratory and confirmatory factor
analysis. An exploratory factor analysis does not require a priori
hypotheses about how items would be grouped together or how
many factors will be derived. As such, this is often the first step
in determining how data are organized. The confirmatory factor
analysis makes use of a priori hypotheses (either derived from a
theoretical framework or a previous factor analysis). For our pur-
poses, we used the factor structure obtained in Study 1B as the a
priori hypotheses about the structure of the data in Study 2. 
54. To determine the items that are grouped together in this analysis,
one must examine the factor loading for each item, which indi-
cates the strength of its association with the group as a whole.
Factor loadings can be thought of as a correlation, and the con-
ventional cutoff is .40. Therefore, those items that have a strong
correlation (>.40) with the factor itself are kept with that factor,
whereas ones with a weak correlation (<.40) are dropped from
that factor. Reasons for low factor loadings can include items
assessing a different construct from the factor or an item being
worded poorly. 
55. Some variables or items may load or be grouped together with
multiple factors. This may be an indication of an item being too
broad, encompassing multiple constructs. There are many ways of
dealing with this both statistically and theoretically. For our pur-
poses, we took a theoretical approach, analyzing each item sepa-
rately to determine whether it was too broad to fit with the con-
struct. 
56. Holliday & Chandler, supra note 6, at 62; Sternberg, supra note 6,
at 613.
57. The full results and detailed statistical analyses can be found in
Jeremy A. Blumenthal & Daria A. Bakina, Judicial Wisdom: An
Empirical Account and Research Agenda (2008) (unpublished
article), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2129792.  
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of the wise-judge-characteristic scale and to establish the
structure of the excellent-judge scale. 
Participants
Participants were a group of 247 incoming first-year law
students. 
Materials
Wise Judge. Nineteen items were presented assessing char-
acteristics of a wise judge (e.g., “A wise judge is a good lis-
tener.”). Items were rated on a Likert scale from 1 (not at all
characteristic) to 7 (very much characteristic).
Excellent Judge. Items were taken from Study 1A, and three
independent raters grouped the original 142 features into 38
categories. The most representative item in each category was
then chosen, resulting in 38 items that were then rated on a
Likert scale from 1 (not at all characteristic) to 7 (very much
characteristic).
Results
A confirmatory factor analysis was performed on the
retained 19 items to find support for the four-factor structure
established in Study 1B. This specific data-analytic strategy
was chosen to replicate the pattern of abstract concepts (e.g.,
intelligence, interpersonal skill) through sets of related con-
crete characteristics. The hypothesized model for the factors of
judicial skill, people skill, open-mindedness to change, and
intelligence were tested as latent factors. In line with previ-
ously established work on implicit theories of wisdom, multi-
ple aspects of wisdom were found in this data. Because the
same items were clustered together in Study 2 as in Study 1B,
the four-factor model was found to be the most appropriate for
understanding judicial wisdom.  
Excellent Judge Exploratory Factor Analysis
Exploratory factor analysis was conducted on the data
obtained for excellent judges. There were initially 38 features
identified that resulted in five general categories of character-
istics of an excellent judge. Seventeen items were dropped due
to poor loading58 or cross-loading. The explanation for poor
loading of these items could be that they were either confusing
to understand (e.g., “involves clients when necessary”), too
broad (e.g., “attends to detail”), or double-barreled (e.g.,
“respects precedents and the rule of law”). It is also possible
that the dropped items did not encompass qualities or charac-
teristics unique to excellent judges (e.g., “thoughtful,” “practi-
cal”). These 17 items were dropped from the analyses. The
final result provided five general categories for characteristics
of an excellent judge. A confirmatory factor analysis was per-
formed on a random subset of the data and supported the five-
factor solution. 
58. Poor loading refers to items that fail to reach the conventional .40
cutoff. This is an indication that the item does not fit with the rest
of the items within the factor. Some items may not fit on any fac-
tors and are removed permanently from analyses.  
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WISE JUDGE, FACTOR ANALYSIS FINAL MODEL
FACTOR LOADINGS
Item 1 2 3 4
A wise judge is honest. 0.680
A wise judge is conscientious about following the law. 0.505
A wise judge is ethical. 0.718
A wise judge is diligent in studying evidence. 0.622
A wise judge is active in the community. 0.567
A wise judge is interested in the community. 0.445
A wise judge is caring. 0.507
A wise judge is spiritual. 0.620
A wise judge has political skill, in the sense of working well with people. 0.487
A wise judge is genuinely interested in people. 0.573
A wise judge is open-minded. 0.620
A wise judge is willing to admit mistakes. 0.411
A wise judge is always prepared. 0.428
A wise judge has empathy. 0.562
A wise judge is capable of making hard decisions. 0.400
A wise judge is rational. 0.517
A wise judge knows how to think. 0.505
A wise judge has superb intelligence. 0.598
A wise judge is intuitive. 0.697
Note: The table summarizes the characteristics of a wise judge in terms of how similar they are to each other within the groups. Each group is called a factor. In this data, we found
that there were four broad categories of judicial wisdom: judicial skill (Factor 1), people skill (Factor 2), open-mindedness to change (Factor 3), and intelligence (Factor 4). The fac-
tor loading is a correlation between the item and the factor, with a conventional cutoff of .40. Any item that has a factor loading of .40 or higher is retained. 
DISCUSSION
This paper summarizes some of the first empirical work to
address judicial wisdom, beginning with two studies trying to
identify lay conceptions of what makes a wise judge. Consis-
tent with past research, respondents seem to conceive of judi-
cial wisdom as similar to the wisdom construct more generally
but seem to include a quality particular to judges as well.
Our findings are useful in a number of contexts. First, they
help lay groundwork for a sustained program of research into
judicial wisdom. Second, they help us move toward developing
an explicit theory of judicial wisdom, one that is better, and
empirically, informed. The pattern of results obtained for char-
acteristics of a wise judge replicate the theoretical approaches
to studying wisdom. The studies presented here apply wisdom
theories, both psychological and philosophical, to the specific
context of judicial wisdom. The four factors identified through
the data—judicial skill (Factor 1), people skill (Factor 2),
open-mindedness to change (Factor 3), and intelligence (Fac-
tor 4)—not only reflect how others perceive what a wise judge
is but also provide support for previously established theoreti-
cal models of wisdom. What is more, the characteristics of wise
judges were generated by judges themselves, providing greater
applicability and generalizability of the data. 
Synthesizing both implicit and explicit theories helps us
derive an idea of the ideal wise person.59 Once there is some
broad consensus about this, we might be able to assess how
close to such an ideal particular people come. If so, then per-
haps it is not unreasonable to use such constructs as evaluation
tools for prospective judges. Third, relatedly, developing robust
implicit theories of judicial wisdom helps researchers under-
stand what lay participants in the legal process expect of
judges. Do they have a sense of judges as reflecting an arche-
typal wisdom, insightful and equitable and perhaps willing to
bend the rules and administer the spirit of the law rather than
the letter, or do they see the wise judge as bound by strictures
of the rule of law, or perhaps something in between? Combin-
ing such findings with existing research into public percep-
tions of the judiciary may be of use. For instance, Bybee and
others have documented that the public views the U.S.
Supreme Court justices as political actors and believe that
political factors influence court decisions more than they
ought.60 One of several questions to connect these lines of
findings is whether such perceptions correlate with a view of
judges as “wise” or with a particular view of what judicial wis-
dom is. Connecting with the point above, another question
might be to examine whether judges are seen as particularly
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59. Ardelt, supra note 2, at xiv.
60. Keith J. Bybee, The Rule of Law Is Dead! Long Live the Rule of Law!,
in WHAT’S LAW GOT TO DO WITH IT? WHAT JUDGES DO, WHY THEY
DO IT, AND WHAT’S AT STAKE 306, 307 (Charles Gardner Geyh ed.,
2011); John M. Scheb & William Lyons, Judicial Behavior and
Public Opinion: Popular Expectations Regarding the Factors That
Influence Supreme Court Decisions, 23 POL. BEHAV. 181, 188-89
(2001).
EXCELLENT JUDGE, EXPLORATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS
FACTOR LOADINGS
Items 1 2 3 4 5
An excellent judge is articulate. 0.620
An excellent judge is knowledgeable. 0.550
An excellent judge is experienced. 0.437
An excellent judge has excellent writing skills. 0.574
An excellent judge is highly intelligent. 0.472
An excellent judge is fair to all parties. 0.404
An excellent judge is neutral and unbiased. 0.667
An excellent judge listens to all sides. 0.668
An excellent judge is humble. 0.445
An excellent judge is kind and caring. 0.869
An excellent judge is sympathetic and compassionate. 0.801
An excellent judge has a sense of humor. 0.476
An excellent judge is ethical. 0.704
An excellent judge has integrity. 0.766
An excellent judge is honest. 0.414
An excellent judge is just. 0.507
An excellent judge treats all parties with respect. 0.500
An excellent judge has an ability to understand biases and prejudices. 0.435
An excellent judge exercises courtesy in judicial matters. 0.648
An excellent judge has the ability to make decisions. 0.436
An excellent judge is willing to learn and grow. 0.553
Note: This table summarizes the findings regarding characteristics of an excellent judge. Each characteristic is grouped with other similar characteristics forming five distinct fac-
tors: intelligence (Factor 1), fairness (Factor 2), compassion (Factor 3), ethics (Factor 4), and respect (Factor 5). Items assessing qualities of an excellent judge were analyzed sep-
arately from the wise-judge characteristics. The factor loading is a correlation between the item and the factor, with a conventional cutoff of .40. Any item that has a factor loading
of .40 or higher is retained.
wise when they act politically, or, perhaps, when they do not
follow the law strictly, or when they do uphold precedent
despite what might be seen as an “unjust” outcome.
Judicial excellence was a secondary focus of this paper, in
which we establish an initial model of how people think about
characteristics of excellent judges. Through examining judicial
wisdom and judicial excellence separately, we find that there
are different characteristics highlighted in each, with some
overlapping attributes. For example, interpersonal skill seems
to be important for both excellence and wisdom. However,
according to this data, to be considered an excellent judge, it is
expected that one is additionally ethical and respectful, even
more so than a wise judge. 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
As noted above, our work begins a research program with
the ultimate, broader goal of pulling together threads of psy-
chological research and philosophical and legal discussions of
judicial wisdom. With the empirical groundwork laid for
assessing both judicial wisdom and judicial excellence, future
research should refine the connection between these two
important qualities of judges. We have raised a number of
questions to be developed as the research progresses, some to
be addressed empirically, and others that will integrate those
empirical findings with our own (and previous) theoretical
work. 
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